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NOTES
Emerging Rights for Owners of Subsided Lands:
Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. York
W.D. York owned property adjacent to the Houston Ship Channel near the
confluence of the channel and the San Jacinto River. Groundwater withdrawal in the Houston-Baytown area had lowered the water table so that
York's property gradually subsided beneath the waters of the ship channel.
Of the 28.083 acres originally conveyed to York only 24.73 acres remained
above water. Coastal Industrial Water Authority, the local government
agency in charge of the Houston Ship Channel,' initiated a condemnation
action as to York's property. Contending that title to the submerged land was
lost to York by operation of law and had vested in either the city of Houston or
the State of Texas, 2 the authority asserted that it was obliged to compensate
York only for the land remaining above water. York filed this declaratory
judgment suit in district court to determine the effect of submergence upon
his ownership. The district court's judgment for York was affirmed by the
court of civil appeals 3 and writ of error was granted by the Texas Supreme
Court. Held, affirmed: Although a riparian owner may not acquire title to
submerged lands by self-help methods such as land fill, an owner is not
divested of title by reason of the submergence of his land beneath navigable
coastal waters. CoastalIndustrial Water Authority v. York, 532 S.W.2d 949
(Tex. 1976).
1.

PAST APPLICATION OF RIPARIAN PRINCIPLES

Riparian, or littoral, 4 land is property located adjacent to a river, stream,
lake, or ocean. 5 When the water level or shore configuration of a riparian
estate changes,,the ownership of the property thereby gained or lost is a
function of both the manner in which the change occurred and the nature of
the body of water or watercourse involved. 6 In this context the general rule is
that a state is the owner, as trustee for the public, 7 of all navigable 8 waters
I. The Coastal Industrial Water Authority is a conservation and reclamation district
created pursuant to ch. 601, §§ 1-11, [1967] Tex. Laws 1381.
2. Coastal Industrial Water Authority relied in part upon ch. 155, § I, [1925] Tex. Laws 366,
by which the State of Texas granted to cities with populations over 40,000 persons the title to the
beds of all streams, rivers, or channels within the cities' corporate limits.
3. Coastal Indus. Water Authority v. York, 520 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1975).
4. The terms riparian and littoral are used interchangeably by the courts.
5. As a condition precedent to the application of many of the riparian principles discussed
in this Note, the property must not only be located next to a watercourse, but also the grant to the
riparian owner must have used the shore or water's edge as the boundary line; a surveyor's call
adjacent to the shoreline is not sufficient. Tyler v. Gonzales, 189 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
6. This Note deals only with riparian rights in the context of changes to riparian boundaries.
For a general discussion of other riparian rights see Hildebrand, The Rights of Riparian Owners at
Common Law in Texas, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 19 (1927).
7. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973). The public rights and easements

which arise from this state ownership include navigation, fishing, hunting, and other recreational
easements. See, e.g., Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935). See

SOUTHWESTERN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

within its territory as well as the bed beneath these waters. 9 This same
fiduciary ownership embraces navigable rivers, 0 lakes," and coastal
waters.' 2 Since a change in a shoreline often means a loss of private property,
questions involving riparian boundaries on navigable waters often present a
3
contest between the state and a private landowner.'
4
Riparian estates may be altered in any one of five ways: accretion,1
reliction,15 erosion,' 6 avulsion,"7 or submergence.' 8 Accretion is an addition to
generally Note, The Public Trust in TidalAreas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79
YALE L.J. 762 (1970). See also 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.32, at 265-71 (A. Casner ed.
1952).
8. The test for the navigability of rivers is set forth in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5302
(1962) which provides in part that "[a]ll streams so far as they retain an average width of thirty
feet from the mouth up shall be considered navigable streams .... " As for other bodies of
water, a navigability-in-fact standard is used. Welder v. State, 196 S.W. 868 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1917, writ ref'd).
9. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973). Two statutes in Texas serve to vest
title to navigable waters and the bed beneath them in the state. TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE
ANN. § 1.01 l(c) (1976) provides in part that the beds of all public rivers, bayous, lagoons, creeks,
lakes, and bays in the state, along with the bed beneath that part of the Gulf of Mexico within
Texas, are property of the state. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.021(a) (1972) provides in part that
the flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, lake, and bay or arm of the
Gulf of Mexico located within the state are the property of the state.
10. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. v.Tarrant
County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 123 Tex. 432, 73 S.W.2d 55 (1934); Manry v.
Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W.2d 438 (1932); State v. Bradford, 121 Tex. 515, 50 S.W.2d 1065
(1932); Motd v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 286 S.W.458 (1926).
I1. See Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935); Note, Waterand
Watercourses-Public Right of Fishery in Navigable Waters over Private Submerged Lands, 12
TEXAS L. REV. 72 (1933).

12. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 142 Tex. 51, 175 S.W.2d 410 (1943). See also City of
Galveston v. Mann, 135 Tex. 319, 143 S.W.2d 1028 (1940); City of Galveston v.Menard, 23 Tex.
349 (1859); Gustafson v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. 67,48 S.W. 518 (1898). In the case of coastal waters
a claim of ownership by the state often raises the question of where the precise boundary between
the upland estate and the public lands lies. At one time this question generated considerable
controversy concerning whether the mean high tide line (common law rule and current rule) or the
line of the highest yearly tide (civil law rule) should apply. Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958); Rudder v.
Ponder, 156 Tex. 185, 293 S.W.2d 736 (1956). See also Humback & Gale, Tidal Title and the
Boundaries of the Bay: The Case ofthe Submerged "Highwater" Mark, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91
(1975); Comment, Fluctuating Shorelines and Tidal Boundaries: An Unresolved Problem, 6 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 447 (1969).

13. The policy behind state ownership of navigable waters and the bed beneath these waters
is to insure that common rights in these waters are preserved for the benefit of the public.
Rossmiller v. State, 114 Wis. 169, 89 N.W. 839 (1902). Furthermore, state ownership allows
trade-offs to be made regarding competing uses of these resources. Lindsay & Phelps Co. v.
Mullen, 176 U.S. 126 (1900). State authority issubject, however, to the superior power of the
federal government for navigational purposes arising from the commerce clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967); United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1897). See generally Leighty, The Source and Scope ofPublic and Private
Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER REV. 391 (1970). See also Leighty, PublicRightsin
Navigable State Waters-Some Statutory Approaches, 6 LAND & WATER REV. 459 (1971).
14. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
920 (1952) (accretion defined as the process of addition to land by means of a naturally caused
gradual and imperceptible deposit of alluvion, or sediment).
15. Baumhart v.McClure, 21 Ohio App. 491, 153 N.E. 211 (1926); Hancock v.Moore, 137
S.W.2d 45 (Tex.Civ. App.-El Paso 1939), aff'd, 135 Tex. 619, 146 S.W.2d 369 (1941).
16. Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606 (1923) (erosion defined as the abrasion or washing
away of soil
from the banks).
17. A common avulsive change is that which occurs when a river cuts through what had been
ahorseshoe or meander. Ross v.Green, 135 Tex. 103, 139 S.W.2d 565 (1940) (a sudden change of
course by a river constituted avulsion). InDenny v.Cotton, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 634, 22 S.W.122
(1893, writ ref'd), avulsion was defined generally as any rapid and sudden change in the
boundaries of a stream or river.
18. Michelsen v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831, 838 (Sup.Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div.
1042, 63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1946) ("[P]roprietorship of land may be lost by... submergence ..
[consisting of) its. . .disappearance under the water and the formation of a more or less
navigable body over it.").
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riparian land by gradual and imperceptible deposits of sediment, or alluvion,
by the action of the water; 9 unlike avulsion,2 ° the process must be so gradual
that its progress cannot be perceived while it is taking place. 2' Reliction is the
addition of soil to a riparian estate due to a permanent recession in the water
level. 22 When an addition to riparian lands occurs by means of accretion or
reliction, the owner of the estate ordinarily gains title to the newly formed
land.23 This result has been reached in cases of land riparian to rivers 24 and to
lakes. 25 The converse of accretion is erosion, the gradual wearing away of the
soil by the action of water. 2 6 A riparian landowner loses title to land adjacent

to rivers2 7 and lakes 28 when carried away by erosion. 29 Avulsion, another
means by which riparian estates are diminished or enlarged, is a sudden
change in the banks or shore of the watercourse.3 0 In contrast to the effect of
accretion or erosion, avulsive changes do not produce changes in ownership
or boundary lines. 31 The doctrine of avulsion applies to land riparian to both
33
rivers 32 and lakes.

A few cases which involve the alteration of riparian boundaries come
within another category: submergence of the riparian estate. Submergence is
the disappearance of land due to the formation of a navigable body of water
19. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191(5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
920 (1952).
20. See note 17 supra.
21. The rate at which the change takes place is the key determinant of whether a change in
riparian boundaries is an accretion or an avulsion. Denny v. Cotton, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 634,639,22
S.W. 122, 124 (1893, writ ref'd) (the process of accretion or reliction is "gradual and imperceptible"; avulsion is a "rapid and sudden change").
22. See authority cited note 15 supra.
23. See, e.g., Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
24. Id.; Pendery v. Panhandle Ref. Co., 169 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943,
no writ); State v. Texas Land & Cattle Co., 34 Tex. Civ. App. 460, 78 S.W. 957 (1904, no writ).
25. Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex. 603, 297 S.W. 225 (1927) (riparian rights
usually associated with rivers attach as well to lakes and ponds regardless of the origin of these
bodies of water); Chew v. DeWare, 207 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1918, writ dism'd)
(after a gradual reliction or recession of a lake's water level, a riparian owner's property extended
to the new lower waterline). Owners of land adjacent to a lake may have a unique riparian right to
the maintenance of a constant water level. See Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
1950); Thomas v. Fin & Feather Club, 106 Tex. 490, 171 S.W. 698 (1914); Lakeside Irrig. Co. v.
Kirby, 166 S.W. 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1914, writ ref'd).
26. Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606 (1923).
27. Hancock v. Moore, 135 Tex. 619, 146 S.W.2d 369 (1941); Whittenberg v. State, 157
S.W.2d 691 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. Lakefront Trust, Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 505 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. Id.; Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W.2d 438 (1932).
30. Denny v. Cotton, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 634, 22 S.W. 122 (1893, writ ref'd).
31. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v.
Kezer, 174 S.W. 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1915, writ ref'd). As an exception to this general
rule, Texas courts have held that when an avulsion in a navigable river results in an abandonment
of a riverbed and the creation of a new bed, the state, as owner of all navigable waters and the
soils beneath them, takes title to the newly created bed. Under this exception, however, title to
islands created by the change remains with the original owner. State v. R.E. Janes Gravel Co.,
175 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1943), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Maufrais v.
State, 142 Tex. 559, 180 S.W.2d 144 (1944). As might be expected, the title to the abandoned
riverbed accrues to the owner of the estate riparian to it. Manry v. Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56
S.W.2d 438 (1932).
32. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918); Marks v. Sambrano, 170 S.W. 546 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1914, writ ref'd).
33. See City of Chicago v. Ward, 169 II1. 392, 48 N.E. 927 (1897); Diversion Lake Club v.
Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935) (the court considered the issue of whether a riparian
owner whose land is inundated by a lake retains an exclusive right to fish in the water above his
land, and assumed that the landowner retained title to his submerged lands).
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over it. 34 Submergence is distinguished from subsidence in that submergence
involves an increase in the water level, the elevation of the riparian land
remaining unchanged, while subsidence is the "lowering or shifting downward" of the land itself.35 When the question of the effect of submergence has
been presented directly, it has been held that the riparian owner retains title to
land submerged beneath a non-navigable lake .3 6 Decisions in Texas and other
jurisdictions have upheld the retention of title by the private owner following
submergence beneath inland navigable waters. 37 At least one Texas court,
however, has implied that the riparian owner loses title to submerged land
when the submergence was beneath a navigable lake. 38 This view is accepted
39
in other jurisdictions.
Riparian boundary changes in the case of lands adjacent to the Gulf of

Mexico are ruled by principles similar to those involved in the case of rivers or
lakes, at least to the extent that land formed by accretion or reliction along the

coast will accrue to the upland owner.4 ° The effect of the submergence of
34. Michelsen v. Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831, 838 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div.
1042, 63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1946).
35. Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ
ref'd).
36. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1935, writ
dism'd); accord, Tapoco, Inc. v. Peterson, 213 Tenn. 335, 373 S.W.2d 605 (1963).
37. See Tapoco, Inc. v. Peterson, 213 Tenn. 335, 373 S.W.2d 605 (1963) (land retained its
character as private property subsequent to submergence beneath a man-made navigable reservoir). In Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935), the submergence of
privately owned land subsequent to the creation of a dam and lake did not divest the owner of
title, but gave rise to a public fishing easement in the water over the privately owned land. The
court reasoned that if the water of all navigable streams is owned by the state in trust for the
public, then the public easements which arise from that trust must extend over all the waters of a
lake created by damming a public stream, and are not confined to that portion of the lake above
the original river channel. A like result upon a substantially similar fact situation was reached in
Schulte v. Warren, 218 III. 108, 75 N.E. 783 (1905). SeealsoStatev. Cockrell, 162 So. 2d 361 (La.
Civ. App. 1964, writ ref'd) (under civil law a private owner retains title to property gradually
submerged beneath navigable waters); Gilbert v. Eldridge, 47 Minn. 210, 49 N.W. 679 (1891)
(riparian owner allowed to reclaim land which had become gradually submerged beneath Lake
Superior on the basis that a gradual encroachment of navigable waters does not divest the private
owner of title); Baumhart v. McClure, 210 Ohio App. 491, 153 N.E. 211 (1926) (as long as the
boundaries of the submerged property remain identifiable, title is not lost to the riparian owner);
State v. West Tenn. Land Co., 127 Tenn. 575, 158 S.W. 746, 752 (1913) (that lands have become
submerged by a body of navigable water does not deprive the owners of their title so long as the
boundaries of the private property can be reasonably identified).
38. See Seabrook Land Co. v. Lipscomb, 331 S.W.2d 429(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960,
no writ). After land riparian to a navigable stream had become submerged beneath the stream, the
court upheld the grant of an injunction, requested by owners of property made riparian by the
submergence, which prohibited the construction of a pier on the submerged land. The court
expressly refrained from deciding whether title to the submerged land had vested in the state.
39. See Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy, 103 Wis. 271, 79 N.W. 436 (1899) (state's title to the
bed beneath navigable lake would be extended to include lands submerged by an increase in the
water level caused by the construction of a dam on the lake if the increased water level continued
long enough to be considered a natural condition); accord, Burrus v. Edward Rutledge Timber
Co., 34 Idaho 606, 202 P. 1067 (1921). See also Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315
(1937) (inundation of private property by navigable water resulted in acquistion by the state of the
land inundated); Jones v. Turlington, 243 N.C. 681, 92 S.E.2d 75 (1956) (dictum) (gradual
encroachment of navigable water divests the owner of title); Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley,
225 Pa. 605, 74 A. 648 (1909) (court cited with approval the statement of the trial court that title to
land submerged by the enlargement of a lake vests in the state); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.
2d 306,462 P.2d 232 (1969) (title to land permanently submerged by construction of a dam was lost
to the state); Attorney General v. Bay Boom Wild Rice & Fur Farm, 172 Wis. 363, 178 N.W. 569
(1920) (riparian owner held not entitled to construct dike on his submerged property on grounds
that title to land submerged beneath navigable lake vested in the state); Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot,
109 Wis. 418, 84 N.W. 855 (1901) (dictum) (state may acquire title to private property following
submergence beneath a navigable lake upon a theory of adverse possession).
40. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
920 (1952); Luttes v. State, 159 Tex. 500, 324 S.W.2d 167 (1958); State v. Balli, 144 Tex. 195,190
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privately owned land beneath coastal waters in Texas, however, is not clear.
Two early cases, Fisher v. Barber4 and Fitzgerald v. Boyles,4 2 held that
submergence beneath coastal waters did not deprive a riparian owner of title
to the submerged land. In City of Galveston v. Mann43 the city argued that it
should be allowed to construct a public wharf partially situated upon submerged property acquired by the city from private owners who had in turn
acquired the property prior to the time it had become submerged beneath the
Gulf of Mexico. The Texas Supreme Court did not explicitly consider the
question of the effect of submergence on title, but held that the proposed
wharf would be an encroachment upon the superior rights of the state in the
bed beneath coastal waters, and denied the city authority to construct the
wharf in the absence of state permission. This holding might be read as a tacit
indication that title to lands which become submerged beneath the Gulf is lost
to the property owner, at least to the extent that the owner may not construct a
wharf upon that property. 4
II.

COASTAL INDUSTRIAL WATER AUTHORITY V. YORK

Coastal Industrial Water Authority v. York, the first reported case to
consider the effect of subsidence upon riparian boundaries, determined that a
riparian landowner does not lose title to a portion of his land which in the
absence of any evidence of erosion has gradually subsided beneath navigable
coastal waters. The court expressly reaffirmed the traditional doctrines as to
accretion, avulsion, and erosion, 45 but decided that a new standard was
applicable. Unlike the foregoing natural phenomena, subsidence is not an
ordinary hazard of riparian ownership because it is not the result of "the force
of the waters which takes from some owners and gives to others." 46 Holding
that subsidence does not divest a riparian owner of title, nor change the
boundary of his land, the court limited the application of the doctrines of
avulsion, accretion, erosion, and reliction and extended the rule of submergence47 in situations involving subsidence of coastal land.
The court could have plausibly determined that subsidence is similar to the
other riparian phenomena in that it is a gradual and imperceptible process and,
therefore, the boundary of a coastal tract should shift with the shoreline as in
•S.W.2d 71 (1944), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 852 (1945); see Curry v. Port Lavaca Channel & Dock
Co., 25 S.W.2d 987 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1930, no writ) (accretions must occur above
the high tide line before the rule as to ownership applies).
41. 21 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, no writ), noted in 8 TEXAS L. REV. 604
(1930).
42. 66 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1931, writ dism'd).
43. 135 Tex. 319, 143 S.W.2d 1028 (1940).
44. In Mulry v. Norton, 100 N.Y. 424, 3 N.E. 581 (1885), a state court employed reasoning
similar to that found in Fisher and Fitzgeraldand held that a private owner did not lose title to
property submerged beneath coastal water. The court emphasized, however, that the boundaries
of the submerged private property remained identifiable beneath the water. But see United States
v. Property on Pinto Island, 74 F. Supp. 92 (S.D. Ala. 1947), rev'd sub nor. United States v.
Turner, 175 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 851 (1949), in which the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the determination by the trial court that the owner of an island off
the Louisiana coast retained title to that part of the island inundated by Gulf waters as a result of a
hurricane.
45. See notes 14-33 supra and accompanying text.
46. 532 S.W.2d at 952.
47. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
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the case of accretion, reliction, or erosion. When considered in light of this

traditional rule that gradual changes work changes in ownership, the Coastal
decision introduces certain disparities in the area of water law. The coastal
riparian owner is unfairly benefited by the decision, for his ownership is now

increased by accretions to his shoreline, but not decreased by its subsidence.
The court distinguishes subsidence, however, from other riparian phenomena
on the basis that no soil is moved or altered. The shoreline simply sinks below

the water as the withdrawal of groundwater diminishes the elevation of the
shore. 48 Moreover, the Coastalresult is consistent with cases in Texas and
other jurisdictions which have considered the effect of submergence, a
process similar to subsidence in that no displacement of soil is involved.49
The decision in Coastal is valuable in that it
hazards of ownership of coastal property. In the
rivers or lakes, the landowner faces the loss of
erosion, but is compensated with the possibility

implicitly recognizes the
case of lands riparian to
land through avulsion or
of gains to his estate by

accretion or reliction. For landowners on the Gulf coast, however, the
probability of gains through any means may be remote in the face of the
certain and continual subsidence which threatens many coastal areas.5 °
Formidable obstacles face a riparian owner who would attempt to recover
damages for subsidence from those persons withdrawing groundwater." The
outcome in Coastal, therefore, may be grounded in a recognition of the
unique characteristics of coastal property.

2

48. 532 S.W.2d at 952.
49. See notes 35-38, 41-42 supra.
50. See Fisher, Subsidence Causes and Effects, TEX. PROF. ENG'R, Apr. 1975, at 8;
Steelhammer & Garland, Subsidence Resulting from the Removal of Groundwaters, 12 S. TEX.
L.J. 201 (1971). See also Bagley, Water Rights Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water
"Mining" in the Southwestern States, 4 J.L. & ECON. 144 (1961); Comment, Ground Water
Management: A Proposal for Texas, 51 TEXAs L. REV. 289 (1973).
51. See Steelhammer & Garland, supra note 50.
52. ' The opinion in the noted case did not extend to a consideration of whether the riparian
owner's loss of title to land which had subsided beneath navigable coastal waters would
constitute a taking of property for which compensation would be due since the outcome of the
case precluded a consideration of this issue and the matter was apparently not raised by the
parties. The courts have not discussed this question directly, but, in broad terms, a taking of
private property for public use makes the payment of adequate compensation necessary. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17; see West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295
U.S. 662 (1935); State v. Hale, 136Tex. 20, 146 S.W.2d 731 (1941). It must be considered whether
a loss of title to subsided lands would constitute the incidental result of an exercise of the police
power, or a taking sufficient to make compensation necessary. A government regulation,
reasonably necessary for a legitimate government end, will not entitle one whom the regulation
deprives of property to compensation. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). Nevertheless, in many cases where property was inundated by water or otherwise physically invaded, it
was held that a taking had occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167,
354 S.W.2d 99 (1961). See generally Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 201 (1971). See also Bagley, Water Rights Law and Public Policies Relating to Ground Water
Coastal, unlike the usual taking-by-inundation case, involves potential loss of property due to
both subsidence and the operation of state statutes and cases which provide that navigable waters
and the beds beneath them are owned by the state. A number of state statutes were found to
involve a taking of property on the basis that the statutes served to cut off vested rights in private
property which arose prior to the effective date of the statutes. See generally Annot., 56 A.L.R.
277 (1928); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1119 (1927). It is doubtful that a riparian owner's interest in
subsided land could be considered a vested right superior to that of a state in light of the
pre-eminent position traditionally accorded the state's authority in this area. Title to navigable
waters and their beds is considered to have passed from the King to the American colonies by
means of royal charters, and this title was passed from the federal government to each state upon
admission to the Union. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970), confirmed the
states' title to beds beneath navigable waters within each state, subject to the federal govern-
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The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Coastalissignificant, not only
in its modification of traditional riparian rules in the case of subsidence, but
also in its explicit formulation of the rule in Texas concerning alteration of
riparian boundaries by artificial means. The courts have indicated in the past
that additions to a riparian estate by man-made or artificial means could not be
claimed by the private owner." In Coastalthecourt makes clear that changes
in riparian boundaries caused by third parties over which the riparian owner
has no control will be viewed in the same light as changes resulting from
natural phenomena. 4
In broad terms, the Coastalholding stands for the proposition that title to
property is not lost to the private owner by reason of subsidence of the
property beneath coastal waters. This holding is limited by a footnote by
Justice Reavley that the holding may not apply to subsidence of land adjacent
to waters affected by tides because this aspect of the case was not raised by
the parties.5 5 The footnote reasons that an application of the case to lands
reached by tides might "allow private owners generally to hold land beneath
the sea, would restrict the enjoyment of public beaches, and would make the
location of seaward boundaries an exercise in pure guesswork.' '56 Why these
concerns are not as relevant in the case of navigable, non-tidal waters as in the
case of navigable, tidal waters is not clear.57 Since this issue was not squarely
presented, the application of Coastalto much of the Gulf coast is uncertain."
Nevertheless, the potential problems raised by Justice Reavley are significant. Private ownership of subsided lands could certainly lead to considerable
conflict between the incidents of private ownership and public rights in
coastal waters such as navigation and fishing easements. 59 A comprehensive
ment's authority in the area of navigation. See, e.g., Shively v.Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). See
also note 12 supra. A similar analysis indicates that even when private ownership is retained
subsequent to submergence beneath navigable waters, the subjection of the property to a variety
of public easements could not be considered a taking in the constitutional sense. Finally, even if
the deprivation of title to subsided land by operation of statute were a taking, a problem is
presented as to the determination of damages. The general rule is that compensation is
determined as of the time of the taking. E.g., United States v. Rogers, 255 U.S. 163 (1921). If
subsidence is an ongoing process, however, it may be difficult to determine at what point an
assessment of adequate compensation should be made.
53. The facts of the cases upon which this rule is based involved situations where the riparian
owner himself made use of artificial means, such as landfill, to extend his property. See, e.g.,
Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 142 Tex. 51, 175 S.W.2d 410 (1943); Cox v. City & County of
Dallas Levee Improvement Dist., 258 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See also Dinkins, Texas Seashore Boundary Law: The Effect of Natural and Artificial
Modifications, 10 Hous. L. REv. 43 (1972).

54. 532 S.W.2d at 952.
55. Id.at 951 n.l.
56. Id.
57. The general rule is that whether or not a body of water is affected by the tide is not
material to the question of its navigability. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9(1971); Manry v.
Robison, 122 Tex. 213, 56 S.W.2d 438 (1932). The state's ownership of all navigable waters, see
notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text, indicates that the presence or absence of the tides should
not control the question of to which waters state ownership extends. In Coastalthe court noted
that the water directly above the disputed property was not in fact used for navigation. The
property, however, was clearly covered by the waters of the Houston Ship Channel, a navigable
body of water. When the water over submerged land is shallow and not capable of being used for
navigation, but is part of a larger, navigable body of water, the title to the submerged property is,
nonetheless, lost to the private owner and vests in the state. United States v. Turner, 175 F.2d 644
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 851 (1949).
58. The tidal-nontidal distinction to which the footnote refers may be questioned due to the
testimony at trial that the disputed property was in fact reached by the Gulf tide. 520 S.W.2d at
497.
59. See notes 7-9, 13 supra.

